92418-4 COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II 15 46687-22016 JAN-4 PM12:57 STATE OF WASHINGTON By DEPUTY

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

No.

Respondent,

v.

FILED E JAN 2 6 2016 WASHINGTON STATE

SUPREME COURT

DARRELL PARNEL BERRIAN,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

DARRELL PARNEL BERRIAN DOC No. 377195, C-A-60-1L Coyote Ridge Corrections Center P.O. Box 769 Connell, Washington 99326-0769

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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

 Petitiner Darrell Parnel Berrian, hereinafter:
 "Berrian," moves this Court to accept review of the Court of Appeals decision terminating review designated in Part B.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

2. Berrian seeks review of the Court of Appeals decision terminating review in <u>State v. Darrell Parnel Berrian</u>, COA No. 46687-2-II, filed on December 15, 2015. A copy of that Opinion is in Appendix A hereto.

C. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

3. Wherefore, Berrian submits the following issue for review:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT LOOKED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A KNIFE'S USE FOR PURPOSES OF RCW 9.94A.825 TO QUALIFY A KNIFE WITH A BLADE UNDER THREE INCHES AS A DEADLY WEAPON?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4. In August, 2013, Berrian was charged with committing first degree assault in Pierce County Cause No. 13-1-03133-9, while armed with a deadly weapon as defined in RCW <u>9.94A.825</u>. The jury answered "yes" to the Special Verdict, exsposing Berrian to increased punishment under RCW 9.94A.533(4)(a)(d).

5. On September 12, 2014, Pierce County Superior Court Judge Jerry T. Costello, imposed Judgment and Sentence upon une a 10-month labily bappe Webinderent, soundard in an

actual 209-month term of confinement imposed. See, <u>Appendix 2:</u> <u>Jaigapat and Johnson</u>. Detrian filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Jab, <u>Johnson Detrian</u>, CON NO. 45507-II. In the Opealing Brief of Appeliant on Appeal, counsel for Cerrian argued: (1) fan Johos's evidence doos not optablish that Corrian intended so thus prote Johly man, thi; (1) fan State's evidence doos abt establish that Detrina assaulted Norriel with a feadly Weapon of that av 765 proof with a deadly Weapon. <u>Attachment</u> <u>Five: State of Appellance</u>.

6. In the Brief of Respondent on appeal, counsel for the state argument: (1) the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find derrian intended to cause great posity have when derrian pluaged a knife deeply enough into derriel's chest to pause pleading around air lungs, and; (2) Fae jury reasonably foun. Election was access with a deadly weapon when the knife istant expressly was vividly demonstrated through the life threadening traine it inflicted. <u>Actornant Six:</u> <u>Brief of deependent</u>.

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E. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS

7. On November 13, 2012, Tavaris Morriel was hanging out with his friends when they decided to walk to a local Texaco Station to purchase beer. 3RP 70,74. While he was at the Texaco, Morriel noticed the store clerk outside arguing with two men. 3RP 75. One of those men, who had dreadlocks at the time, was later identified as Berrian. 3RP 120. Morriel went outside and tried to difuse the situation. 3RP 76. This resulted in a physical fight between Morriel and Berrian. 3RP 78.

8. Morriel and Berrian fought, pulling each other to the ground. 3RP 78. When the fight stopped, Berrian and the man he was with began to walk away. 3RP 78. Soon after, Berrian ran up behind Morriel. 3RP 83. Berrian then plunged his knife into Morriel's chest. 3RP 83-84. Morriel could not remeber much about the knife, but he recalled it was a short "shank" about the size of his thumb. 3RP 86.

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3RP 92-93. He testified that he had some numbness around the wound, and that he cannot take breaths as deep as he used to. 3RP 93-94. However, Dr. Strong testified that she would not expect a stab wound like the one Morriel sustained to cause permanent loss or impairment of an organ or bodily function. 2RP 82-83, 84.

F. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

13. <u>The 48-month Deadly Weapon Enhancement to Berrian's</u> <u>First Degree Assault Sentence was Imposed Contrary to Washington</u> <u>Law</u>. In a jury trial, Berrian was found guilty of committing assault in the first degree by means of a knife, RCW <u>9A.36.011</u>, a deadly weapon within the meaning of RCW <u>9.94A.110(6)</u>, and of the aggravating factor of committing that same aasault while armed with that same knife, a deadly weapon within the meaning of RCW <u>9.94A.825</u>.

14. Initiative Measure 159, the "Hard Time for Armed Crime Act," was passed during the 1995 legislative session and became effective for offenses committed after July 23, 1995. This initiative increased penalties and expanded the range of crimes eligiable for weapon enhancements. For specified crimes, when a court makes a finding of fact or when a jury returns a special verdict finding that the accused or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon (RCW <u>9.94A.825</u>) at the time of the commission of the crime, the sentence must be enhanced. The

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Then the total is the offender of an accomplice was around with a firearm $(\underline{ACU}|J,\underline{A1},\underline{\partial1\partial})$ at the state of the countration of the orige.

15. Ine sencence enhancement statute, <u>ACH 2.91A.533</u>, Vas enastes, withjout] amendment, after voters passed initiative measure 159. Into statute mundates the additional punisament for stimes conditional with a discourt of, as applicable mero, with a coudily version obnet than a firearm:

> (4) Due following additional time shall be added to the standard sentence range for followy origon condition after July 33, 1993, if the offender of an accomplication was achieved a deadly weapon other than a fireary is usingly in <u>ACL 9.41.010</u>:

 (a) first years for any followy defined under any law as a class A followy or with a scatterpy maximum sentence of at least 20-years;

(a) If one offendor is using percented under (a) of this sockion for any deadly weapen contants and the offender and previously been contants for any weakly weapen contants after July 23, 1006, while subsection (3)(a) of this consection, all really weapen contants under this subsection chall be twice the amount of the contants at listed.

<u>204 3.344.033(4)(2)(8).</u>

16. Assault in the Sirst Degree is a class A Selony. <u>RCJ 5A.20.921</u>. Service's conviction of that prime and the jury's Special Version finding that he was arased with a deadly weapon other than a firster during the consistion of that crime, subjected his to a 24-month deally weapon enhancement under <u>RCJ 9.94A.533(4)(a)(d)</u>. However, because he had previously

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been sentended for a firears enhancement under <u>RCA 0.044.533</u> (3)(a) in Pierce County Cause No. 13-1-02707-2, the 24-month enhancement term doubled to 45-month pursuant to <u>RCA 0.944.533</u> (4)(d). Frue, as a sentence for Serrian, the trial court imposed a 161-month stimuard range sentence and, pursuant to the special vardict, a 45-month deadly weapon enhancement which, "nowithstanding any other provision of law, shall be served in tetal confinement and shall fun consecutively to all other sentencing provisions." <u>ACA 5.944.533 (4)(d)</u>.

17. For purposes of the special variet, the State told the jury Berrina was arasel with "L one and a half to two-inch kalfe." ARP 93. Appear, pursuant to <u>RCH 9.94A.325</u>, a kalfe is not a deadly weapon unless it has a blade longer than 3-inches. Faus, the kalfe the state alloyed that Berrian was arased with during consistion of his trine is not a deadly weapon as a matter of law. Because their is no indication in the SAA of legislative intent to trent the list of instruments identified as deadly weapons in <u>RCH 9.94A.325</u> as anything other than an exclusive list, the 43-month deadly weapon canademat to Berrian's first degree assault seatence must be vacated. Statutory construction supports this conclusion.

18. In interpreting a statute, the court's primary purpose is to determine and enforce the intent of the

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legislatura. <u>State v. Jacobs</u>, 154 Wash.24 595, 500, 113 P.3d 251 (2005). "'[I]f the scatute's meaning is plain on it's face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent."' <u>Jacobs</u>, 154 Wash.2d at 500, 115 P.3d 251 (quoting <u>Dep't of Scology V. Chapbell & Gwinn</u>, 145 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). In ascertaining the "plain meaning" of a scatute, the court looks not only to the ordinary asaning of the language at issue, but also to the general context of the statute, the provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. <u>Jacobs</u>, 154 Wash.2d at 600, 115 P.3d 251. If, upon this eximination, the provision is subject to more than one remember interpretation, it is amongaous and the rule of lenity requires the court to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant. <u>Jacobs</u>, 154 Wash.2d at 600-01, 115 P.3d 251. Juch is the case at bar.

19. In <u>State v. Zunwalt</u>, 79 Mash.App. 124, 901 2.21 319 (1995), division one of the Court of Appeals of Mashington acknowledgel a knife is a deadly Meapon as a matter of law for purposes of ACM 9.94A.125 (recodified <u>RCM 9.94A.825)</u> if it has a blade longer than 3-inches. However, the Court held, "Maen the orige was committed with a knife having a blade shorter than 3-inches, the state must prove that the knife had the capacity to cause the victim's death and was used in a way that was likely to produce or could have easily and readily produced

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death." <u>Junwalt</u>, 79 Wash.App. at 129-130; citing <u>Jeath V. Cook</u>, 59 Wash.App. 412, 417-413, 343 P.23 1325 (1993); <u>State V. Lua</u>, 52 Wash.App. 34, 42, 313 P.2d 533, review denied, 117 Wash.2d 1025, 320 P.2d 510 (1991). Relevant to this determination, the Court held, "are the defendant's intent and present ability, the degree of force used, the part of the body to which the weapon was applied, and the injuries inflicted." <u>Junwalt</u>, 79 Wash.App. at 130, citing <u>State V. Phompson</u>, 33 Wash.2d 545, 543-49, 554 P.2d 323 (1977).

20. In concluding that a shife with a blade 3 inches or late may constitute a deadly weapon depending upon the circumstances of its use for purposes of <u>3CJ 3.94A.125</u>, division one in <u>Aunwalt</u> relied on its decisions in <u>Cook</u>, 69 When.App. at 417-410, and <u>Sun</u>, 52 Mach.App. at 42, and the Supreme Court's decision in <u>Promoton</u>, 33 Mach.2d 543-549, as precedent supporting its coclusion. Mowever, none of these cases delt with deadly Meapon findings under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), <u>3CM</u> <u>9.94A.125</u>, <u>act 9.94A.602</u>, nor <u>3CM 9.04A.325</u>.

21. Division One's opinion in both <u>Cook</u> and <u>Lun</u> ware premised on our Supreme Court's decision in <u>Thompson</u>. By special vordict, the jurys in <u>Cook</u>, <u>Lua</u>, and <u>Thompson</u>, found that each defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, to wit; a knife having a blade 3-inches or less as defined in <u>RCN 9.95.040</u> during the

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use constantine if it is a deadly wappen for purposes of 300 0.04A.120, 300 0.024A.500, nor 300 0.04A.320.

24. RCN J.94A.325 states:

For purposes of this section, a deally wanpon is an implement or instrument which are the separity to inflict death, and from the memor in which it is used, is likely to produce or may resily and readily produce death. The following instruments are notified in the term deadly wappen: Blackjack, sting shot, billy, said club, such bag, metal knutches, any dirk, dagger, pistol, revolver, or any other firears, any waite having a black longer than three incress, any recor with an unguarded plate, any metal pipe or our used or intended to be dead as a plue, any explosive, any wappen containing poisonous or injurious yes.

<u>Add 9.014.025</u>. Charts is ap indication in <u>207 9.944.025</u>, apr In the SAA as a shale, of a legislative intend to treat the instruments designated as deadly weapons in <u>207 9.944.025</u> as any thing other than conclusive. In identifying the instruments lesignated as deadly weapons in <u>207 9.944.025</u> the legislature did not, as an example, precede the list of identified instruments in <u>207 9.944.025</u> with notice, as it did in <u>207</u> <u>9.95.010</u>, that the parase deadly weapon "is not limited to" the instruments identified in the statues. It is reasonable, charafore, to assume the legislature intended the instruments it identified as deadly weapons in <u>207 9.944.025</u> to be conclusive.

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25. A coyieg of uvacy based seafears enhancement statute in the say percent of a version of a legislature literation a factor to chhande a contemp, and output an offically to facesaged punigament, it was sucharizely identified any modifused that factor is the statute. Sea, s.g., <u>ath 3.018.300(5)</u> (iiu: of approxito, directoritecto de entre placeriale, ao puzzybilente sectence is (selucive); <u>23/().011.313(7)</u> (authopicing swo-year echnosecoto is rellector contello concenze for each prior videore listal in 200 10.01.0003); 007 3.014.033(3) (nairophian) ennederent zi dag nifsesk senteret il prine var bunulitur in one of Sive productive const); <u>kir 3.344.333(3) (adthoriding</u> enaladeset it hay there teators if this was condered in a coderational Werellicy); <u>NC1 0.943.033(0)</u> (augapeiulay 13aoabh sannachtad ta resisare isr seasl cualarr fir (da); <u>RCH 0.014.533(3)</u> (bitabrialor 10, 10, or 01, used a sumandamont, depending on followy of and lighting, is the print was demually motivatel); <u>227 0.000.503(12)</u> (astartiting 12-goath parameter for assault of law hufbroback/ageney balloyab); 207 0.914.303 (10) (authopility incourse in standard charge contacts if the offerer involved the companyation, thrantening, or solicitation of a minor in orige to avolve that since in the commission of a felony). Hoap of bries incomes paraneuroni statutet empower the trier of fact to 'shape fact' to bring the defaulter.

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this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals affirmance of the 48-month deadly weapon enhancement imposed upon Berrian by the trial court on that basis. What is vexing here, the Court should find, is the fact that the jury was never instructed to look at the circumstances of the knife's use to qualify the knife as a deadly weapon. Thus, the deadly weapon enhancement imposed must be VACATED.

G. CONCLUSION

28. Because Berrian's instant petition involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the Supreme Court, the Court should accept review.

It Should be so Ordered.

DATED this 30th day of December, 2015.

Respectfully submitted, BY THE PETITIONER:

Davall Parrel Berrias

DARRELL PARNEL BERRIAN DOC No. 377195, C-A-60-1L Coyote Ridge Corrections Center P.O. Box 769 Connell, Washington 99326-0769

DECLARATION OF MAILING

This is to certify that I, the undersigned, deposited in the U.S. Mail at the Coyote Ridge Corrections Center, a true and correct copy of my PETITION FOR REVIEW, postage pre-paid and properly addressed to the following source:

> Kathleen Proctor Deputy Prosecuting Attorney WSB# 14811 930 Tacoma Avenue South, Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171

DONE this 30th day of December, 2015.

BY THE PETITIONER:

Darrell Parnel Berrian

APPENDIX

"A"

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION TERMINATING REVIEW

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

December 15, 2015

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DARRELL PARNEL BERRIAN,

Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SUTTON, J. — Darrell Parnel Berrian appeals his conviction and sentence for first degree assault with a deadly weapon and the deadly weapon sentence enhancement. Berrian argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of intent to cause great bodily harm and that he was armed with and assaulted Tavaris Morriel with a deadly weapon. In his statement of additional grounds (SAG), Berrian also argues that (1) the trial court improperly admitted the photomontage from which Morriel identified Berrian as his assailant, (2) the trial court impermissibly closed the court room when it answered a jury question, (3) the State was relieved of its burden of proof because the jury instructions were improper, and (4) his trial coursel was ineffective for failing to propose a self-defense jury instruction.

We hold that the State presented sufficient evidence of intent to cause great bodily harm, Berrian was armed with a deadly weapon, the trial court did not err in admitting the photomontage, the trial court did not close the court room when it answered the jury's question, the trial court's jury instructions were not improper, and Berrian received effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm his conviction and deadly weapon sentence enhancement.

No. 46687-2-II

FACTS

I. STABBING INCIDENT

On the evening of November 12, 2012, Morriel was spending time with two of his friends. The three were drinking alcohol, and at midnight they walked down the street from the apartment complex they were in to a gas station to purchase more beer. While he was inside the store, Morriel saw a store employee arguing with two black men in the parking lot. Morriel went outside "to calm the situation down" by talking to them. 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 76. When he approached and told the two men to "chill out," one of the men, whose hair was in long dreadlocks, swung at Morriel, and the two began fighting. 3 VRP at 76.

Morriel estimated that they fought in the parking lot for five to ten minutes and ended up on the ground. Eventually, the men were separated. Morriel watched the two men walk down the street; then, he began to walk across the street in the other direction with his two friends, and soon after one of his friends told him that someone was running toward them. Morriel turned around, and the man with dreadlocks who he had been fighting with stabbed Morriel in his torso, close to his left breast, with a small knife that had a two inch blade. Once he realized what had happened, Morriel walked across the street from the gas station to his girlfriend's apartment, where he was contacted by the police and medical aid personnel.

Morriel was transported to the emergency room, where he was treated by a trauma surgeon. According to the trauma surgeon, the location of Morriel's wound, near the diaphragm, was "concerning" and that it is possible to have a wound to the chest which penetrates "all the way into the abdomen." 2 VRP at 75. The trauma surgeon performed a laparoscopic procedure on Morriel to ensure that the knife had not done so. Also, a stabbing injury like Morriel's could have

punctured a lung. Morriel experienced immediate "bleeding around the lung," which meant that the knife penetrated deep enough to cause muscular bleeding in the chest cavity. 2 VRP at 77.

Morriel continued to have difficulty breathing after he was released from the hospital. Morriel sought medical treatment again, and doctors discovered blood accumulation around Morriel's lung. Morriel then underwent surgery to remove a clot that had formed in his wound. If Morriel had not received treatment when he did, the blood clot would have been life threatening. About eight months after the stabbing, he had a small scar and numbness where he was stabbed, had a longer scar from the surgery, and he still could not breathe normally or "take deep breaths." 3 VRP at 93-94.

II. PHOTOMONTAGES¹

Because Morriel could not give law enforcement more than a general description of his assailant, no detective was immediately assigned to investigate the case. In August 2013, however, an inmate at Pierce County jail sent information to the Lakewood Police Department that another inmate had told him he stabbed someone the previous fall in the neighborhood where the gas station is located. Detective Jeff Martin investigated the tip.

Martin received the name of the informant, but he did not immediately speak with that person because he wanted to independently verify the information. The informant had provided a description of the suspect who had committed the stabbing and specified that it was someone

¹ The trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue. At trial, the jury heard testimony from the Pierce County jail informant, Morriel, and Jeff Martin, the detective who created the two photomontages and who testified at length about the process of creating and presenting the montages to Morriel.

within his unit in the jail, so Martin searched through the inmates that were currently housed in that particular jail unit. Based on the description the informant provided, Martin narrowed down the possible suspects to a single person. This person was not Berrian.

After he identified a possible suspect, Martin created a photomontage that included the suspect he had narrowed down to but did not include Berrian. The montage included the suspect's booking photo with five additional booking photos of black males that looked similar to the suspect. This montage was on a single sheet of paper. Martin informed Morriel that officers "may have had a break in the case," and he and another officer met with Morriel on August 7 to present him with the montage. 4 VRP at 22. Before Morriel looked at the montage, he read and signed an admonishment that told him not to guess in his choice and that the photos should not influence his judgment. Morriel selected the person who Martin had earlier identified as the suspect,² but stated that he was only "60 percent" certain that the person he chose was his assailant. 4 VRP at 26.

The next day, Martin contacted the jail informant. During that interview, the informant told Martin that his cellmate, Berrian, was the person who said he had stabbed a person at a gas station the previous fall. Berrian told the informant that after the incident he had shaved off his dreadlocks to "disguise himself." 2 VRP at 169.

With this new information, Martin created a second photomontage that included Berrian's photograph with the only photograph that Martin could obtain at the time. Martin obtained this photograph from Pierce County jail, and Berrian did not have dreadlocks in the photo. In this

² This person was not Berrian.

montage, eight different photos were on separate pages. Berrian's photograph was photo number seven. Martin created the second montage different from the first photomontage because the only photo of Berrian available to Martin at the time was "slightly unique compared to -- typical photographs." 4 VRP at 29. Martin chose the photos for the second montage based on different aspects of their similarity to Berrian's photo, such as two individuals with their mouths open and two in gray clothing. All of the photos were of black males in jail uniforms.

When Martin contacted Morriel again to look at the second montage, Martin told Morriel that he "might have been right about being wrong" about his first choice. 3 VRP at 130. Before looking at the photos, Morriel again read and signed an admonishment identical to the first admonishment. Martin asked the officer who accompanied him, who had no knowledge of the investigation, to show the photos to Morriel so as to alleviate any suggestiveness that Martin may have conveyed. Morriel had an emotional reaction when he turned the page to Berrian's photograph and immediately identified Berrian as his assailant. At trial, Morriel again identified Berrian as the man who stabbed him.

III. PROCEDURE

The State charged Berrian with one count of first degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon.

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A. CrR 3.6 MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHOTOMONTAGES & MOTION TO DISMISS

Berrian moved to suppress evidence of the two photomontages and Morriel's identification of him using the photomontages. At the CrR 3.6 hearing, defense counsel waived an evidentiary hearing on the photomontage issue because the surrounding facts were undisputed. The trial court found that because the parties' pleadings sufficiently described the circumstances of the montages and the key facts were largely undisputed, testimony was unnecessary and would not "appreciably add to the Court's understanding." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 85.

Before counsel provided oral argument on the suppression motion, the trial court noted that he had read the parties' briefs on the motion and asked counsel to focus on the suggestiveness of the photomontages. Following argument, the trial court denied Berrian's motion to suppress the photomontages because the second montage was not overly suggestive.

The trial court reasoned that the second photomontage and Berrian's photo in it was not "alarmingly unusual" because all of the men were black males who "generally resemble [Berrian]." CP at 85, 86. The trial court explained that Martin's comment about Morriel's uncertainty in his choice from the first photomontage "did not suggest to Mr. Morriel that he should choose anyone from among the eight photographs." CP at 87.

After the State rested its case, Berrian moved to dismiss the charge. Berrian argued that the State had not presented sufficient evidence of his intent to cause Morriel great bodily harm or that he was armed with a knife that had a blade three inches or longer. The trial court denied Berrian's motion.

B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, QUESTION & VERDICT

The State proposed jury instructions and, before the trial court ruled on its specific instructions, defense counsel indicated that he had no objections to the State's proposed instructions. The trial court's to-convict instruction on first degree assault provided as follows:

To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the first degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) That on or about November 13, 2012, the defendant assaulted Tavaris Morriel;
 (2) That the assault was committed with a deadly weapon or by a force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death;

(3) That the defendant acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm; and

(4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

CP at 152. The trial court instructed the jury that "[g]reat bodily harm means bodily injury that creates a probability of death, or that causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or that causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ." CP at 154.

As to the State's charge of a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement, the trial court instructed the jury that a deadly weapon is "any weapon, device, or instrument, which under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm." CP at 156. The trial court further instructed the jury that substantial bodily harm is "bodily injury that involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or that causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or that causes a fracture of any bodily part." CP at 157.

During deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a question, but the parties did not designate the question in the Clerk's Papers on appeal, and the trial court did not read the question into the record. However, the trial court opened its discussion of the jury question by asking counsel if

both of them had had a chance to review it. Defense counsel responded, "Yes, Your Honor." 4 VRP at 125. The parties and the trial court then discussed how to answer the question, and the trial court ruled that it would answer as defense counsel had requested.

The jury found Berrian guilty of first degree assault and found by a special verdict that he was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the assault. Berrian appeals.

ANALYSIS

Berrian raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the State failed to prove every element of first degree assault because it did not present sufficient evidence of intent to inflict great bodily harm. Second, Berrian argues that the State also failed to present sufficient evidence that Berrian assaulted Morriel with a deadly weapon, an element of first degree assault, or that he was armed with a deadly weapon, a requirement of the sentencing enhancement. We disagree.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Due process requires the State to prove every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Kalebaugh*, 183 Wn.2d 578, 584, 355 P.3d 253, 256 (2015). To determine if the State presented sufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Condon*, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314, 343 P.3d 357 (2015). An appellant's claim of insufficient evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence and "all inferences that reasonably can be drawn [from it]." *Condon*, 182 Wn.2d at 314 (alteration in original) (quoting *State v. Salinas*, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)).

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II. INTENT TO INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM

Berrian argues that the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm because the knife he used was two inches, the knife wound did not impact any of Morriel's vital organs, the injury caused "only some internal bleeding," and the wound left a small scar. Br. of Appellant at 11. We disagree.

The State charged Berrian with first degree assault under RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). That statute provides that a person commits first degree assault "if he or she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm . . . [a]ssaults another." RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). Great bodily harm is "bodily injury which creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ." RCW 9A.04.110(4)(c).

To find Berrian guilty of first degree assault, the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Berrian, when he stabbed Morriel, "acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm." CP at 152. The trial court's jury instructions defined great bodily harm as "injury that creates a probability of death . . . or that causes . . . impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ." CP at 154.

A person acts with intent "when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." RCW 9A.08.010. First degree assault requires proof of specific intent, which is intent to produce a specific result. *State v. Elmi*, 166 Wn.2d 209, 215, 207 P.3d 439 (2009). Evidence of intent "is to be gathered from all of the circumstances of the case, including not only the manner and act of inflicting the wound, but also the nature of the prior relationship and any previous threats." *State v. Wilson*, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994)

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(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *State v. Ferreira*, 69 Wn. App. 465, 468, 850 P.2d 541 (1993)). Specific intent may not be presumed, but we may infer it "as a logical probability from all the facts and circumstances." *Wilson*, 125 Wn.2d at 217.

We have previously held that stabbing a person in the chest falls within the statutory standard of great bodily harm. *State v. Langford*, 67 Wn. App. 572, 587, 837 P.2d 1037 (1992), *review denied*, 121 Wn.2d 1007 (1993), *cert. denied*, 510 U.S. 838 (1993). We have also previously held that a rational jury could find that the defendant acted with intent to cause great bodily harm when he stabbed several people "in the back, chest[,] or stomach" and one person needed several surgeries to repair the damage. *State v. Huddleston*, 80 Wn. App. 916, 922, 912 P.2d 1068 (1996).

The State's evidence at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to find that Berrian acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm when he stabbed Morriel. After fighting in the gas station parking lot, Morriel and Berrian left the area in opposite directions. As Morriel and his friends walked away, however, Berrian ran back to him and stabbed Morriel. It is undisputed that Berrian stabbed Morriel in his chest, near his left breast and the area of his diaphragm and his lungs. If Morriel had not undergone surgery for the blood clot that formed around his lung after his initial treatment, the injury inflicted by Berrian would have threatened Morriel's life. Morriel was unable to take deep breaths even after healing from the surgery. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can be inferred "as a logical probability" from these facts and circumstances that Berrian acted with specific intent to inflict great bodily harm. *Wilson*, 125 Wn.2d at 217.

III. ARMED AND ASSAULTED VICTIM WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Berrian also argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that he was armed with a deadly weapon and assaulted Morriel with that deadly weapon. We disagree.

The crime of first degree assault, as charged by the State, requires proof that Berrian assaulted Morriel with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). A deadly weapon under the crime of first degree assault is a weapon "which, under the circumstances in which it is used ... is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm." RCW 9A.04.110(6).

The State's information further charged that Berrian's sentence should be enhanced because he was armed with a knife, "a deadly weapon," when he assaulted Morriel.³ CP at 1-2. To enhance a defendant's sentence following a guilty verdict, the jury must find that the defendant used "an implement or instrument which has the capacity to inflict death and from the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce or may easily and readily produce death." RCW 9.94A.825.

The trial court instructed the jury that a deadly weapon is a weapon which, "under the circumstances in which it is used . . . is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm." CP at 156. Substantial bodily harm is "bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ." RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b). The trial court's jury instruction defining substantial bodily harm was identical to this statute.

A knife that has a blade longer than three inches is per se a deadly weapon. RCW 9.94A.825. It is a question of fact for the jury, however, whether a knife that has a blade

³ RCW 9.94A.530 provides that the trial court may sentence a person to serve additional time on a standard range sentence if the jury finds that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon.

shorter than three inches is a deadly weapon. *State v. Cobb*, 22 Wn. App. 221, 223, 589 P.2d 297 (1978). "The test is not the extent of the wounds actually inflicted." *Cobb*, 22 Wn. App. at 223. "Rather, the test is whether the knife was capable of inflicting life threatening injuries under the circumstances of its use." *Cobb*, 22 Wn. App. at 223 (emphasis omitted).

In *Cobb*, we held that the State presented sufficient evidence of a deadly weapon where a knife with less than a three inch blade produced a cut over the sternum bone, a cut to the forehead, and a cut in the muscle of the left arm. *Cobb*, 22 Wn. App. at 223. Although these injuries were not life threatening, we reasoned that a reasonable jury could have found that the knife was a deadly weapon in part because it could "inflict a penetrating wound to the chest cavity and endanger major structures." *Cobb*, 22 Wn. App. at 223-24.

Likewise, in *State v. Thompson*, 88 Wn.2d 546, 564 P.2d 323 (1977), the defendant used a pocketknife with a blade two to three inches in length to assault the victim during a robbery. The defendant held the knife against the victim's neck, and the victim sustained bruises on her right arm and a cut on her neck. *Thompson*, 88 Wn.2d at 550. Given these circumstances of the knife's use, our Supreme Court held that the jury could have properly found that the knife was a deadly weapon. *Thompson*, 88 Wn.2d at 550.

Here, the only evidence of the size of Berrian's knife was Morriel's estimation that it was "about two inches." 3 VRP at 86. Thus, the knife was not per se a deadly weapon under RCW 9.94A.825.

The circumstances in which Berrian used the knife, however, demonstrate that the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife was a deadly weapon. The trauma surgeon who treated Morriel testified that the location

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of Morriel's wound, near the diaphragm, was "concerning" and that it is possible to have a wound to the chest which penetrates "all the way into the abdomen." 2 VRP at 75. She further explained that a stabbing injury like Morriel's could have punctured a lung. Morriel experienced immediate "bleeding around the lung," which meant that the knife penetrated deep enough to cause muscular bleeding in the chest cavity. 2 VRP at 77.

Following his initial treatment, Morriel continued to experience shortness of breath. Morriel underwent surgery to clear a clot that had formed around his lung. If Morriel had not sought medical treatment for the clot, the injury would have been life threatening. Morriel testified that he still could not take deep breaths. Thus, the State provided sufficient evidence that Berrian used the knife in a way that could have easily produced Morriel's death. Therefore, a reasonable jury could have found that Berrian was armed and assaulted Morriel with a deadly weapon.

SAG ISSUES

Berrian raises two issues in his SAG that we do not address on the merits. First, Berrian claims that the informant's testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Assuming that Berrian is referring to the testimony of the Pierce County jail informant, Berrian does not identify which portion of the informant's testimony he believes was inadmissible hearsay, and he does not provide further argument on why this testimony was inadmissible. To the extent that the informant's testimony consisted of hearsay, however, the out of court statements that he testified to were Berrian's own words and were thus admissible. ER 801(d)(2) (party opponent's statements are not hearsay).

Second, Berrian claims that "[t]he State refused to introduce any Georgia State statutes [that] may be found to be comparable to any Washington State statutory language." SAG at 2.

Our State Supreme Court has held that a defendant's "affirmative acknowledgment" that prior outof-state convictions are properly included in his or her offender score satisfies the State's burden to prove comparability of prior out-of-state convictions. *State v. Ross*, 152 Wn.2d 220, 230, 95 P.3d 1225 (2004) (emphasis omitted). Berrian's judgment and sentence includes two prior Georgia convictions in his criminal history and, at the sentencing hearing, Berrian did not dispute the calculation of his offender score. 4 VRP at 134-35 ("The Court: Is there any quarrel with the calculation of Mr. Berrian's offender score? [Defense counsel]: No, Your Honor."). Thus, Berrian has waived this claim of error.

Berrian raises five additional issues in his SAG. All of these claims of error fail.⁴

I. PHOTOMONTAGE

Berrian first argues that the trial court erred by admitting the second photomontage from which Morriel identified Berrian as his assailant. Berrian claims that the trial court erred when it admitted the photomontage because (1) admission of the photomontage violated his right to due process, (2) the identification procedure was conducted while he was in custody, and (3) Martin's

⁴ Berrian also argues that irregularities at trial prevented him from having a fair trial and thus we should overturn the jury's verdict, citing CrR 7.5(a)(5). Other than his assignments of error, Berrian does not specify what irregularities justify reversing his conviction. Because the trial court did not err in any of the claims Berrian raises in his SAG, and the trial proceeding below otherwise appears to be fair, public, and proper, this claim also fails. RAP 10.10(c).

comment that Morriel may have been "right about being wrong" was tantamount to witness tampering.⁵ 3 VRP at 130. The trial court did not err by admitting the photomontage.⁶

A. DUE PROCESS

Berrian argues that the trial court violated his right to due process and abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the photomontage, which he argues was improperly suggestive. Berrian also argues that the trial court violated his right to due process because it failed to adequately discuss the rules applicable to admitting photomontage evidence, requiring him to argue that the photomontage was suggestive.⁷

An out-of-court identification of a suspect using a photomontage violates a defendant's right to due process if the procedure was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." *State v. Vickers*, 148 Wn.2d 91, 118, 59 P.3d 58 (2002) (quoting *State v. Linares*, 98 Wn. App. 397, 401 989 P.2d 591 (1999)). Due process concerns arise in the context of an eye witness identification only when an identification procedure

⁵ Berrian also argues that the photomontage was "harmfully prejudicial and toxic" to his "burdens and presumptions." SAG at 12. To the extent that this argument is not an extension of Berrian's due process arguments, this claim of error fails because Berrian did not object to the photomontage below under prejudice grounds. Thus, he failed to preserve it. *State v. Hamilton*, 179 Wn. App. 870, 878, 320 P.3d 142 (2014) ("Even if a defendant objects to the introduction of evidence at trial, he or she 'may assign evidentiary error on appeal only on a specific ground made at trial." (quoting *State v. Kirkman*, 159 Wn.2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125 (2007)).

⁶ Berrian notes that he "has not been provided with a copy of any of the trial court['s] order, minute entries," or other relevant materials "to better focus the issues." SAG at 20. Berrian cites RAP 9.11, which allows us under certain circumstances to direct the trial court to take additional evidence before we decide a case. This rule does not apply here.

⁷ Berrian further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in "overlook[ing] the well established" law on this issue. SAG at 13. Because admission of the photomontage did not violate Berrian's right to due process, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

is both suggestive and unnecessary. State v. Sanchez, 171 Wn. App. 518, 573, 288 P.3d 351 (2012).

Berrian repeatedly asserts that the trial court shifted a burden onto him to disprove suggestiveness of the photomontage before requiring the State to prove the necessity of the evidence. We disagree. Washington State case law is clear that when challenging the admissibility of an identification from a photomontage the *defendant* first carries the burden to establish impermissible suggestiveness. *Vickers*, 148 Wn.2d at 118. If the defendant fails to meet this burden, the inquiry ends. *Vickers*, 148 Wn.2d at 118. However, if the defendant meets this burden, the trial court then considers, based on a totality of the circumstances, whether the procedure "created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." *Vickers*, 148 Wn.2d at 118. When deciding the admissibility of a suspect identification, the trial court must ensure that the identification is reliable by evaluating "the witness's opportunity to observe the suspect, the accuracy of any prior descriptions, the witness's level of certainty, and the passage of time." *State v. Collins*, 152 Wn. App. 429, 434, 216 P.3d 463 (2009).

Berrian cannot demonstrate that Martin's second photomontage, from which Morriel identified Berrian, was impermissibly suggestive. All eight photographs in the photomontage were booking photographs of black males who appeared to be the same general age. Although Berrian's facial expression in the montage is somewhat unusual, Martin deliberately chose the other seven photographs to prevent Berrian's photo from standing out.⁸ As the trial court reasoned, Berrian's

⁸ Martin chose two individuals with their mouths closed and two individuals with their mouths open; for each of these discrete categories, Martin chose two photos of inmates with orange uniforms and two inmates with gray uniforms.

photograph is not so unusual so as to "leap off the page." CP at 86. Thus, the trial court properly denied Berrian's motion to suppress the photomontage because it was not impermissibly suggestive. Therefore, the trial court need not have explicitly discussed necessity, contrary to Berrian's argument.

We also disagree that the trial court failed to consider applicable law on this issue and that it was uninterested in an in depth discussion. Both defense counsel and the State provided full briefing on the issue. At the CrR 3.6 hearing, the trial court noted that it had read the parties' briefs on the motion and asked counsel to focus on the suggestiveness of the photomontages. This request does not mean that the trial court ignored applicable case law. Furthermore, the trial court holds broad inherent power and statutory authority over courtroom operations. *State v. Lormor*, 172 Wn.2d 85, 93, 257 P.3d 624 (2011). The record reflects that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in asking counsel to focus on a particular issue.

B. IN-CUSTODY IDENTIFICATION

Berrian also argues that the photomontage was inadmissible because Martin should have used a line-up instead because Berrian was in custody. We disagree.

Berrian relies heavily on *State v. Thorkelson*, which explained previous dicta by our Supreme Court that "disapproved of the use of photographic identification procedures when a suspect is in custody," favoring a lineup procedure instead. *State v. Thorkelson*, 25 Wn. App. 615, 618, 611 P.2d 1278 (1980). Division Two of this court declined to follow the *Thorkelson* reasoning. *State v. Royer*, 58 Wn. App. 778, 782, 794 P.2d 1325 (1990). "[A] photographic identification conducted while a defendant is in custody, although not favored, will be suppressed only if it is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification." *Royer*, 58 Wn. App. at 782 (quoting *State v. Weddel*, 29 Wn. App. 461, 473, 629 P.2d 912 (1981)). This holding is nearly identical to our Supreme Court's current rule on the admissibility of photomontages. *See Vickers*, 148 Wn.2d at 118.

Berrian also relies on *State v. Nettles*, which disapproved of the specific photographic identification procedure used in that case. *State v. Nettles*, 81 Wn.2d 205, 207, 209, 500 P.2d 752 (1972) (in an investigation involving two suspects, victim was shown only four photographs two weeks before trial, two women and two men; one of the photographs of the men was one defendant and one of the women was the other defendant). The *Nettles* court described a favored procedure:

The witness should be shown the pictures of a number of possible suspects. The pictures of those suspects upon whom police suspicion has alighted at the time should not be particularly distinguishable from the other photographs shown to the witnesses; nor should any words or actions on the part of the police indicate the "favored" suspect.

Nettles, 81 Wn.2d at 210.

According to Martin's testimony at trial, the favored procedure in *Nettles* is precisely the procedure Martin used in the two photomontages. Martin included multiple photos of individuals that were not "particularly distinguishable" from each other, and another detective unfamiliar with the investigation presented the photos to Morriel so as to ensure Martin's conduct was not suggestive. *Nettles*, 81 Wn.2d at 210. As concluded above, the trial court properly denied Berrian's motion to suppress because this procedure was not impermissibly suggestive. Thus, Berrian's claim that the photomontage must be suppressed because he was in custody fails.

C. WITNESS TAMPERING

Lastly, Berrian argues that the trial court erred in admitting the second photomontage because Martin's comment that Morriel's uncertainty in his pick from the first photomontage may have been correct was equivalent to witness tampering. No evidence on the record suggests that Martin's conduct amounted to witness tampering.

Witness tampering, among other actions, is an attempt to influence a witness to testify falsely.⁹ *State v. Williamson*, 131 Wn. App. 1, 6, 86 P.3d 1221 (2004), as amended (2005). In a prosecution for witness tampering, the State is entitled to rely on both the literal meaning of the words used to influence the witness as well as inferences from the words and the context in which they were used. *State v. Rempel*, 114 Wn.2d 77, 83-84, 785 P.2d 1134 (1990).

The record does not contain any evidence that Martin attempted to influence Morriel to testify falsely or that supports an inference that Martin engaged in witness tampering. Martin's comment about Morriel's uncertainty did not suggest a specific person that Martin believed Morriel should choose from the second photomontage. Nor did Martin's comment suggest that Morriel should withhold testimony. In fact, the admonishment that Morriel read before looking through the photomontages instructed him to not guess and that the photographs were not meant to influence his judgment. Martin did not threaten Morriel or direct him to pick a certain individual from the montage. Thus, Berrian's claim of witness tampering fails.

⁹ RCW 9A.72.120 provides that a person is guilty of witness tampering when he or she "attempts to induce a witness . . . or a person whom he or she has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation . . . to: (a) [t]estify falsely or . . . to withhold any testimony; or . . . (c) [w]ithhold from a law enforcement agency information which he or she has relevant to a criminal investigation."

II. PUBLIC TRIAL

Berrian next argues that the trial court violated his right to a public trial when it considered a jury question "in camera" without applying the *Bone-Club*¹⁰ factors.¹¹ SAG at 3. We disagree.

A criminal defendant's right to a public trial is guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wash. Const. art 1, § 22. We analyze whether the trial court impermissibly closed the court room according to a three-step framework. *State v. Love*, 183 Wn.2d 598, 605, 354 P.3d 841 (2015). First, we ask whether the defendant's right to a public trial attaches to the particular proceeding at issue. *Love*, 183 Wn.2d at 605. Second, if the public trial right attaches to the proceeding, we ask whether the courtroom was closed. *Love*, 183 Wn.2d at 605. Lastly, we ask if the courtroom closure was justified. *Love*, 183 Wn.2d at 605. The appellant carries the burden to prove the first two steps while the proponent of the alleged closure carries the burden to prove the third step. *Love*, 183 Wn.2d at 605.

The right to a public trial attaches to the trial court's handling of a jury question. *See State v. Koss*, 181 Wn.2d 493, 501, 334 P.3d 1042 (2014) (addressing appellant's claim that the trial court impermissibly closed the courtroom when it did not discuss the jury's question on the record). Thus, Berrian has met his burden on the first step of the public trial framework. *Love*, 183 Wn.2d at 605.

¹⁰ State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995).

¹¹ Although Berrian did not object to the alleged courtroom closure below, he may raise his right to a public trial for the first time on appeal. *State v. Shearer*, 181 Wn.2d 564, 569-70, 334 P.3d 1078 (2014).

However, Berrian cannot meet his burden on the second step of the framework, whether the courtroom was actually closed to the public. *Love*, 183 Wn.2d at 605. The record does not reflect that the trial court addressed the jury's question in a closed courtroom. Thus, Berrian's claim fails.

III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Berrian next argues that the State was relieved of its burden to prove every essential element of first degree assault because the trial court did not properly instruct the jury.¹² By shifting the "preliminary burden of proof" onto the defense by not receiving testimony on the photomontage procedure, Berrian argues that the trial court could not have accurately instructed the jury on the elements of the charged crime. SAG at 20. We disagree.

We review challenges to the legal sufficiency of jury instructions de novo. *State v. Walker*, 182 Wn.2d 463, 481, 341 P.3d 976, *cert. denied* 135 S. Ct. 2844 (2015). Jury instructions that relieve the State of its burden to prove every essential element of the charged crime are not legally sufficient. *Walker*, 182 Wn.2d at 481.

The to-convict jury instruction on first degree assault in this case is identical to WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, 35.02. *Cf.* 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, 35.02 at 452 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC 35.02) and CP at 152. The Washington Pattern Instruction on first degree assault mirrors the statutory

¹² Defense counsel accepted the State's proposed jury instructions without objection because they were "straight out of the [Washington Pattern Jury Instructions]." 4 VRP at 66. However, because the due process clause requires the State to prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and a jury instruction that relieves the State of its burden is an error of constitutional magnitude, Berrian may raise challenges to the jury instructions for the first time on appeal. *State v. Ridgley*, 141 Wn. App. 771, 779, 174 P3d 105 (2007).

elements of first degree assault.¹³ *Cf.* WPIC 35.02 and RCW 9A.36.011. The to-convict instruction twice told the jury that it must find every element listed in the jury instruction beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, nothing in the to-convict jury instruction on first degree assault relieved the State of its burden to prove every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The legal sufficiency of this jury instruction is unrelated to the admissibility of the photomontage, which as we held above the trial court properly admitted. Therefore, Berrian's claim of error fails.

IV. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Finally, Berrian argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to propose a selfdefense jury instruction because Morriel was intoxicated and the testimony of the State's witnesses was conflicting.¹⁴ Because Berrian was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction and trial counsel's request for such an instruction would have been futile, his claim of error fails.

¹³ WPIC 35.02 provides that the jury should be instructed on the elements of first degree assault as follows:

To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the first degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

⁽¹⁾ That on or about(date), the defendant assaulted(name of person);

⁽²⁾ That the assault was committed [with a firearm] [or] [with a deadly weapon] [or] [by a force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death];

⁽³⁾ That the defendant acted with intent to inflict great bodily harm; and

⁽⁴⁾ That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence. you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

¹⁴ Berrian further assigns error to his trial counsel's performance "for not challenging the State" on the issues he raises in his SAG. SAG at 2. Berrian's counsel objected to introduction of the photomontage, which constitutes the majority of Berrian's argument in his SAG. Because we hold that the remaining claims of error in Berrian's SAG fail for various reasons, we do not further consider Berrian's claim that his counsel was ineffective on these issues.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under our state and federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel. *State v. Jones*, 183 Wn.2d 327, 339, 352 P.3d 776 (2015). To prevail on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, the defendant has the burden to establish (1) that counsel's representation was deficient by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had been effective. *Jones*, 183 Wn.2d at 339.

Our review of an attorney's performance is "highly deferential." *State v. Humphries*, 181 Wn.2d 708, 720, 336 P.3d 1121 (2014). If trial counsel's conduct may be considered a legitimate trial tactic, his or her performance is not deficient. *Humphries*, 181 Wn.2d at 720. To overcome our presumption that trial counsel's performance is reasonable, a defendant bears the burden to establish the absence of a legitimate trial tactic that explains trial counsel's performance. *State v. Hamilton*, 179 Wn. App. 870, 879-80, 320 P.3d 142 (2014). We review the reasonableness of counsel's performance by considering all the circumstances surrounding counsel's trial decisions. *Hamilton*, 179 Wn. App. at 879.

B. SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION

A defendant is entitled to a self-defense jury instruction when he or she produces "some evidence" of self-defense. *State v. Walden*, 131 Wn.2d 469, 473, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. *Walden*, 131 Wn.2d at 473. "Evidence of self-defense is evaluated 'from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent person, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing all the

defendant sees." *Walden*, 131 Wn.2d at 474 (quoting *State v. Janes*, 121 Wn.2d 220, 238, 850 P.2d 495 (1993)).

No evidence on the record demonstrates that Morriel was the first aggressor in the fist fight at gas station, which would have put Berrian in a position to defend himself. Instead, Morriel testified that he intervened in an argument between Berrian and a store clerk. According to Morriel's testimony, one of the men arguing with the clerk, Berrian, swung at him after he tried to calm the situation. The fist fight between Morriel and Berrian ended and Morriel began to walk away, but Berrian, ran back to him and stabbed him with a knife. There is no evidence in the record that Berrian acted in self-defense, and thus Berrian was not entitled to a self-defense instruction.

Morriel's level of intoxication, alone, is not sufficient to justify a self-defense instruction without "some evidence" that Berrian acted in self-defense. *Walden*, 131 Wn.2d at 473. Nor would inconsistent witness testimony justify the need for a self-defense instruction without evidence that Berrian's conduct was justifiable self-defense. The testimony at trial did not establish that Berrian was entitled to a self-defense instruction because he did not produce any evidence of self-defense. Therefore, defense counsel's request for a self-defense instruction would have been futile. Berrian's counsel was not deficient for failing to request such an instruction.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the State presented sufficient evidence of intent to cause great bodily harm, Berrian was armed with a deadly weapon, the trial court did not err in admitting the photomontage, the trial court did not close the court room when it answered the jury's question, the trial court's

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jury instructions were not improper, and Berrian received effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm his conviction and deadly weapon sentence enhancement.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

We concur:

Ê. J.

APPENDIX

"2"

FELONY JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

.

4044 Pres 1	SerialID: 7A	3-1-03133-9 Date: September 742C29-110A-9BE2-A9 in Stock Plerce County Clerk, 1	D6AA0947E1	32BD13-1-03133-9
r竹 2 〇 3 〇 3				
5 10日10日 1月1日 1月1日 1月1日 1月1日 1月1日 1月1日 1月	SUPERIOR COURT OF WAS STATE OF WASHINGTON,	1		FILED DEPT 7 IN OPEN COURT SEP 1 2 2014 Piorce County Clerk DEP
10 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 14 15	Plaintiff, V3 DARRELL PARNEL BERRIAN Defendant SID: WA27230532 DOB: 12/09/1981	CAUSE NO. 13-1-0. JUD GMENT AND S Of Prison [] RCW 9.94A.7129 [] Jail One Year or L [] Firz-Time Offend [] Special Sexual Of [] Special Drug Offe [] Altanstive to Cor [] Clerk's Action R 4.7 and 4.8 (SSOSA) [Juvenile Decline [ENTENCE 9.94A.507 Pris ess fender Sentenci finement (AT equired, para 4.15.2, 5.3, 5	son Confinement 9-16-14 SEP 1 5 2014 cing Alternative ng Alternative C) 4.4.5 (SDOSA), 6 and 5.3
16 17 18	I. H 1.1 A sentencing hearing was held and the defend attorney were present.	EARING mt, the defendant's lawy	ver and the (de	puty) prosecuting
	IL F	INDINGS		
19	There being no reason why judgment should not be pro	nounced, the court FIM	DS:	
20 21	2.1 CURRENT OFFENSE(S): 'The defendant w by [] plea [X] jury-verdict [] bench trial		1/14	
22 23	GOUNT CRIME RCW	ENHANCEMENT TYPI+	DATE OF CRIME	INCIDENT NO.
	I ASSAULT IN THE 9A.36 011(1) FIRST DEGREE (E23)	(a) D	09/05/13	LAKEWOOD PD 123180029
24 25 26 27 28	 * (F) Firearm, (D) Other deadly weapons, (V) VUCS. (JP) Juvenile present, (SM) Sexual Motivation, (SC 9.94A_533(8). (If the crime is a drug offense, inclu as charged in the <u>Jury Verdict</u> Information [X] A special verdict/finding for use of deadl RCW 9.94A_602, 9.94A_533. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (JS) 	F) Sexual Conduct with the the type of drug in th	a Child for a' e second colu	n, See RCW 46,61.520, Fee. See RCW mn)
9 E 19 9 9 E 19 9	(Felony) (7/2007) Page 1 of 11	9-09014	-6	Office of Proseculing Attorney 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Teleptume: (253) 798-7400

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Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 1914 Seria11D: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD13-1-03133-9 Certified By: Kevin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington

- [] Current offenses encompassing the same criminal conduct and counting as one crime in determining the offender score are (RCW 9.94A_589):
- [X] Other current convictions listed under different cause numbers used in calculating the offender score are (list offense and cause number): ATTEMPTED ROBBERY IN THE FIRST DEGREE; UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM IN THE FIRST DEGREE, 13-1-02707-2

2.2 CRIMINAL HISTORY (RCW 9.94A, 525):

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COUN	Γ.	CRIME	DATEOF	SENTENCING COURT	DATEOF	A or J ADLT	TYPLOF
NO			SENTENCE	(Courty & State)	CRIME	лv	CRIME
- 1		ELPOSSESS LLED SUBSTANCI	<u>c</u> 06/24/99 a	Lowndes Co. Superior CL. GA	05/07/99	A	
2	SALEOF	COCAINE	08/16/11	Lowndes Co. Superior Ct., GA	05/18/10	A	
	[_]_Theen	rt finds that the	following price convict	ions are one offense i	For purposes of	determini A	ing the
คา	Att. Row UPOF	10 w/FAC	2/14/14	Pierce Co., wA	7/7/13	A	
23	SENTENC	INGDATA:		•			
COUNT NO.	OFFENDER SCORE	SERIOUSNESS LEVEL	STANDARD RANGE (nct including mhore on or	FLUS ENHANCEMENTS	TOTAL STAN RANGE (including subm	. }	MAXIMUN TERM
I	5	XII	138-184 MOS	48 MOS	186-2321	105	LIFE
2.5	[] above th [] The above the i [] Agg wait Findings of attached. T ABILITY owing, the defendant's that the defi herein. RC	te standærd rangd defendant and si ve the standærd r interests of justic rævating factors ved jury trial, [fact and conclu- the Prosecuting J TO PAY LEGA defendant's past s finæncial renout endant has the al W 9.94A.753.	idard range for Count(e for Count(s) interstipulate that justic ange and the court find the and the purposes of t were [] stipulated by to found by jury by spec- sions of law are attached Attorney [] did [] did I. FINANCIAL OBE, present and finure abl ces and the likelihood pility or likely finture abl	e is best served by im s the exceptional sent he sentencing reform he defendent, [] four ial interrogatory. d in Appendix 2.4. [I not recommend a sir IGATIONS. The cou- lity to pay legal finan- that the defendant's si- pility to pay the legal	ence furthers an act. ad by the court.) Jury's special nilar sentence art has considere cial obligations, actus will chang financial obligat	d is cons siter the o interrograd the tota including a. The co icons imp	istent with defendant atory is al amount g the surt finds osed
	[] The fol		inary circumstances ex				

усци 1999.g	Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 14 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD[3-]-03133-9 Certified By: Kevin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington
ආ ල 2	2.6 [] FELONY FIREARM OFFENDER RECISIRATION. The defendant committed a felony firearm offense as defined in RCW 9.41.010.
0 0 3	[] The court considered the following factors:
	[] the defendant's criminal history.
4	[] whether the defendant has previously been found not guilty by reason of insanity of any offense in this state or elsewhere.
5	 [] evidence of the defendant's propensity for violence that would likely endanger persons. [] other:
νγωι: Ο· Γ"Γ"	[] The court decided the defendant [] should [] should not register as a felony firearm offender.
(N 7 p)	III. JUDGMENT
(³) 8	3.1 The defendant is GUILTY of the Counts and Charges listed in Peragraph 2.1.
(J 9	3.2 [] The court DISMISSES Counts [] The defendent is found NOT GUILTY of Counts
9	
10 st	IV. SENTENCE AND ORDER
^{e4} 11	IT IS ORDERED:
() () () () () () () () () () () () () (
bare r	4.1 Defendant shall pay to the Clerk of this Court: (Pierce County Clerk, 936 Tecome Ave #110, Tecome WA 98402)
년) 13	JASS CODE
≥ ⊕ 14	RTN/R/N \$ Restitution to:
•	Restitution to: (Name and Addressaddress may be withheld and provided confidentially to Clerk's Office).
15	PCV \$ 500.00 Crime Victim assessment
16	DNA \$100.00 DNA Database Fee
17	PUB \$ 1500.°° Cart-Appointed Attorney Fees and Defense Costs
	FRC \$200.00 Criminal Filing Fee
5654 [8 9866	FCM \$Fine
19	
20	OTHER LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS (specify below)
	\$Other Costs for:
21	\$Other Costs for:
22	\$ Z300.00 TOTAL
23	The above total does not include all restitution which may be set by later order of the court. An agreed restitution order may be entered. RCW 9.94A.753. A restitution hearing:
6 6 F 6 24	[] shall be set by the prospector
25	is scheduled for (25)24
	X RESTITUTION. Order Attached
26	[] The Department of Connections (DOC) - shale of the event deal increasion in the increasion of Department
27	 The Department of Corrections (DOC) or clerk of the court shall immediately issue a Notice of Payroll Deduction. RCW 9.94A 7602, RCW 9.94A 760(8).
28	
	JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (JS)
	(Felony) (7/2007) Page 3 of 11 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7400
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
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1		Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 4 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD[3-]-(Certified By: Kevin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington	93133-9
2.		[X] All payments shall be made in accordance with the policies of the clerk, commencing immediates the court specifically sets forth the rate herein: Not less than <u>Per Doc</u> per commencing. <u>Per Doc</u> . RCW 9.94.760. If the court does not set the rate here defendant shall report to the clerk's office within 24 hours of the entry of the judgment and set up a payment plan.	month ein, the
4 5		The defendant shall report to the clerk of the court or as directed by the clerk of the court to prov financial and other information as requested. RCW 9.94A.760(7)(b)	
6		[] COSTS OF INCARCERATION. In addition to other costs imposed herein, the court finds defendant has or is likely to have the means to pay the costs of incarceration, and the defends ordered to pay such costs at the statutory rate. RCW 10.01.160.	
8		COLLECTION COSTS The defendant shall pay the costs of services to collect unpaid legal fi obligations per contract or statute. RCW 36 18 190, 9.94A.780 and 19.16.500.	
		INTEREST The financial obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments. RCW 10.82.090 COSTS ON AFPEAL An award of costs on appeal against the defendant may be added to the t	
10		financial obligations. RCW. 10.73.160.	uai regai
11 II	4.1b	ELECTRONIC MONITORING REIMBURSEMENT. The defendant is ordered to reimbur (name of electronic monitoring agency) at	;e
12	4.2	for the cost of pretrial electronic monitoring in the amount of \$ [X] DNA TESTING. The defendant shall have a blood/biological sample drawn for purposes of	of DNA
13		identification analysis and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. The appropriate ag county or DOC, shall be responsible for obtaining the sample prior to the defendant's release for confinement. RCW 43.43.754.	ency, the
<u> </u>		[] HIV TESTING. The Health Department or designee shall test and counsel the defendant for soon as possible and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. RCW 70.24.340.	HIV es
· · · · 15	4.3	NO CONTACT 3.18.86	
16		The defendant shall not have contact with <u>Town's Lamon Morete</u> 3.15.56 limited to, personal, verbal, telephonic, written or contact through a third party for <u>Life</u> <u>percent the maximum statisticary sequence</u>).	ng, bui not 1975 (not to
17 18		[] Domestic Violence No-Contact Order, Antihurassment No-Contact Order, or Sexual Assaul Order is filed with this Judgment and Sentence.	t Protection
10 19	4.4	OTHER: Property may have been taken into custody in conjunction with this case. Property n returned to the rightful owner. Any claim for return of such property must be made within 90 d 90 days, if you do not make a claim, property may be disposed of according to law.	
20		Sv usya, it you do not mare a claim, property may be disposed for activities from the	
444421 1059			
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****27 *****			
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			Office of Prosecuting Attorney 931 Tacoma Avenac S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7400
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чыца попец]				Date: September 14 10A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD[3-] ce County Clerk, Wastrington	-03133-9
r- 2	4.4a	[] All property is hereby forfei	ited		
0 2 0 3		[] Property may have been taken into custody in conjunction with this case. Property may be returned to the rightful owner. Any claim for return of such property must be made within 90 days. After 90 days, if you do not make a claim, property may be disposed of according to law.			
4	4,40	BOND IS HEREBY EXONER	ATED		
5 11046 111777	4.5	CONFINEMENT OVER ONE (a) CONFINEMENT. RCW: confinement in the custody	9.94A.589. Defendent is	sentenced to the following term of to	tal
的 你 8 何		161 months on Count	I	months on Count	
9		months on Count	Manhaport	months on Count	
10 성 어 11				months on Count d in Section 2.1, the defendant is sent n the custody of the Department of C	
Ø-44.12		4 cj months on Count N	, I	months on Count No	
		months on Count N	0	months on Count No	
0 14 15		months on Count N	lo	months on Count No	
16		Sentence enhancement [] concurrent Sentence enhancement [X] flat time		ved	
ссье 18 стер					ransecutive to
19		Actual number of months of tot	al confinement ordered is	alog months	Consecutive to 13-1-02707-2
20		(Add mand atory firearm, deadly other counts, see Section 2.3, Section	y weapons, and sexual me entencing Data, above).	otivation enhancement time to run cos	secutively to
21				s) a mandatory minimum term of CW 9.94A. 589. All counts shall be se	
22		concurrently, except for the por deadly weapon, sexual motivati	tion of those counts for v on, VUCSA in a protecte	which there is a special finding of a fin ad zone, or manufacture of methamph	earm, other etamine with
23 449.0 a 24		juvenile present as set forth abo consecutively:		cept for the following counts which s	hall be served
25				sentences in other cause numbers im	
20	5	sentences in other cause numbe	rs imposed after the com	ntence herein shall run concurrently a mission of the crime(s) being sentenc	ed except for
2	7				
25	8	Confinement shall commence i	mmediately unless others	wise set forth here:	
<u>ነሀፍ «</u> አስተር		HMENT AND SENTENCE (JS) ny) (7/2007) Page 5 of 11			Office of Prosecuting Attorney 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7460

1	Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 14 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BDj3-1-03133-9 Certified By: Kevin Stock Plerce County Clerk, Washington
2 3 4	(c) The defendant shall receive credit for time served prior to sentencing if that confinement was solely under this cause number. RCW 9.94A S05. The time served shall be computed by the jail unless the credit for time served prior to sentencing is specifically set forth by the court: <u>HCC 1000</u> devis.
	4.6 [] COMMUNITY PLACEMENT (pre 7/1/00 offenses) is ordered as follows:
5	Count for menths;
6	Count for months;
7	Count for months;
8	X) COMMUNITY CUSTODY (To determine which offenses are eligible for or required for community custody see RCW 9.94A.701)
	The defendant shall be on community custody for:
9	Count(s) 36 months for Serious Violent Offenses
10	Count(s)18 months for Violent Offenses
11	Count(s) 12 months (for crimes against a person, drug offenses, or offenses involving the unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member or associate)
12	
13	Note: combined term of confinement and community custody for any particular offense cannot exceed the statutory maximum. RCW 9.94A.701.
14	(B) While on community placement or community custody, the defendant shall: (1) report to and be available for contact with the assigned community corrections officer as directed; (2) work at DOC- approved education, employment and/or community restitution (service); (3) notify DOC of any change in
15	defendant's address or employment; (4) not consume controlled substances except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions; (5) not unlawfully possess controlled substances while in community custody; (6) not
16 17	own, use, or possess firearms or ammunition; (7) pay supervision fees as determined by DOC; (8) perform affirmative acts as required by DOC to confirm compliance with the orders of the court; (9) abide by any additional conditions imposed by DOC under RCW 9.94A 704 and .706 and (10) for sex offenses, submit
18	to electronic monitoring if imposed by DOC. The defendant's residence location and living arangements are subject to the prior approval of DOC while in community placement or community custody.
19	Community custody for sex offenders not sentenced under RCW 9.94A.712 may be extended for up to the statutory maximum term of the sentence. Violation of community custody imposed for a sex offense may result in additional confinement.
20	The court orders that during the period of supervision the defendant shall:
	[] consume no al cohol.
21	N have no contact with: <u>see §7.3</u>
22	M remain M within M outside of a specified geographical boundary, to wit: <u>per DoC</u>
23	[] not serve in any paid or volunteer capacity where he or she has control or supervision of minors under 13 years of age
24	[] participate in the following crime-related treatment or counseling services:
25	[] undergo an evaluation for treatment for [] domestic violence [] substance abuse [] mental health [] anger management and fully comply with all recommended treatment.
26	[] comply with the following crime-related prohibitions:
27	[] Other conditions:
	JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (JS) (Felony) (7/2007) Page 6 of 11 Olice of Prosecult

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Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 1014 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD13-1-03133-9 Certified By: Kevin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington

C)	2		V. NOTICES AND SIGNATURES	
d Qree	3	5.1	COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT. Any petition or motion for collateral attack on Judgment and Sentence, including but not limited to any personal restraint petition, state habeau petition, motion to vacate judgment, motion to withdraw guilty plea, motion for new trial or mo- arrest judgment, must be filed within one year of the final judgment in this matter, except as pro RCW 10.73.100. RCW 10.73.090.	s corpus stion to
(ካ ተሳ ርጉ	5 6 7 8 9	5.2	LENGTH OF SUPERVISION. For an offense committed prior to July 1, 2000, the defendant remain under the court's jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a 10 years from the date of sentence or release from confinement, whichever is longer, to assure juli all legal financial obligations unless the court extends the oriminal judgment an additional 10 ye offense committed on or after July 1, 2000, the court shall retain jurisdiction over the offender, purpose of the offender's compliance with payment of the legal financial obligations, until the completely satisfied, regardless of the statutory maximum for the crime. RCW 9.94A.760 and 9.94A.505. The clerk of the court is authorized to collect unpaid legal financial obligations at a offender remains under the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of his or her legal financial obligations for RCW 9.94A.760(4) and RCW 9.94A.753(4).	period up to payment of ears. For an for the obligation is RCW my time the
1 해 1 이 1 신 1	10 1 2	5.3	NOTICE OF INCOME-WITHHOLDING ACTION. If the court has not ordered an immed of payroll deduction in Section 4.1, you are notified that the Department of Corrections or the of court may issue a notice of payroll deduction without notice to you if you are more than 30 day monthly payments in an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable for one month. RO 9.94A, 7602. Other income-withholding action under RCW 9.94A may be taken without further RCW 9.94A, 760 may be taken without further notice. RCW 9.94A, 7606.	lerk of the 's past due in CW
ца 1 гі	3	(5.4)	RESITTUTION HEARING.	
5. I	4		[] Defendant waives any right to be present at any restitution hearing (sign initials): X	*
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		5.5	CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL COLLECTION. Any violation of this Judgm Sentence is punishable by up to 60 days of confinement per violation. Per section 2.5 of this de legal financial obligations are collectible by civil means. RCW 9.94A.634.	
· 1	16 17 18	5.6	FIREARMS. You must invnediately surrender any concealed pixtol license and you may use or possess any firearm unless your right to do so is restored by a court of record. (Th shall forward a copy of the defendant's driver's license, identicerd, or comparable identification Department of Licensing along with the date of conviction or commitment.) RCW 9.41.040, 9	e court clerk a to the
1	19	5.7	SEX AND KIDNAPPING OFFENDER REGISTRATION. RCW 9A.44.130, 10.01.200.	
	20	<i>1</i>	N/A	
66655 Frem ,	21	5.8	[] The court finds that Count is a felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle The clerk of the court is directed to immediately forward an Abstract of Court Record to the De Licensing, which must revoke the defendent's driver's license. RCW 46.20.285.	
	23	5.9	If the defendant is or becomes subject to court-ordered mental health or chemical dependency t the defendant must notify DOC and the defendant's treatment information must be shared with the duration of the defendant's incorceration and supervision. RCW 9.94A, 562.	reatment, DOC for
	24	11		
	25	ll.		
	26	"		
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1.665 7777		 		•
	28			·
			MENT AND SENTENCE (JS) y) (7/2007) Page 8 of 11	Office of Prosecuting Attorney 930 Tacuma Avenue S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7400
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1,14 Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 1 1.5 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD13-1-03133-9 Certified By: Kevin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington 1 71 5.10 OTHER: 2 гi ୍ଦି 3 4 DONE in Open Court and in the presence of the defendant this date; 24 5 6 JUDGE Print name ¢١ 7 Ë) ្ស៊ី 8 Attorney for Defendar άJ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Jesse Williams 9 W Print name: Print name: #3553 WSB WSB # 10 1 $\overline{\gamma}$ 11 Defendent 12 Print name: n 13 24 VOTING RIGHTS STATEMENT: RCW 10.64.140. I acknowledge that my right to vote has been lost due to 14 felony convictions. If I am registered to vote, my voter registration will be cancelled. My right to vote may be đ restored by: a) A certificate of discharge issued by the semencing court, RCW 9.94A.637; b) A court order issued 15 by the sentencing court restoring the right, RCW 9.92.066, c) A final order of discharge issued by the indeterminate sentence review board, RCW 9.96050, or d) A certificate of restoration issued by the governor, RCW 9.96020. 16 Voting before the right is restored is a class C felony, RCW 92A.84.660. Darrell Berrich 17 bblai Defendant's signature: FILED DEPT ULU - 18 IN OPEN COUR 40.0.0 19 2014 20 Pierce Coupts Clerk 21 By DEPUTY 22 23 UNE - 24 0 0 0 0 25 26 27 28 JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (JS) (Felony) (7/2007) Page 9 cf 11 Office of Prosecuting Attorney 4 L L 1. 1. 1. 1.

930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7400

`]	Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 14 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD13-1-03133-9 Certified By: Kevin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington	
0 2	CERTIFICATE OF CLERK	
G 3	CAUSE NUMBER of this case: 13-1-03133-9	
4	I, KEVIN STOCK Clerk of this Court, certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment and Sentence in the above-entitled action now on record in this office.	
5	WITNESS my hand and seal of the said Superior Court affixed this date:	
6		
Q 7	Clerk of said County and State, by:, Deputy Clerk	
(^{M)} () 8		
01 600 - 9	IDENTIFICATION OF COURT REPORTER	
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28	JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (JS)	
	(Felony) (7/2007) Page 10 of 11 930 Tacoma Arenue S. Roo Tacoma, Washington 98402 Telephone: (253) 798-7400	m 946

1	Case Number, 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 1014 SeriaIID: 7A742C29-11CA-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD] 3-1-0 Certified By: Kevin Slock Pierce County Clerk, Washington	93133-9
() 	APPENDIX "F"	
0 0	The defendant having been sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a:	
Free 4	sex offense serious violent offense assault in the second degree	
6	any crime where the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon any felony under 69.50 and 69.52	
0.1 7	The offender shall report to and be available for contact with the assigned community corrections officer	as directed:
15 17 - 8	The offender shall work at Department of Corrections approved education, employment, and/or commun	ity service;
M 9	The offender shall not consume controlled substances except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions:	
тг г г 10	An offender in community custody shall not unlawfully possess controlled substances;	
र्ज त्वे 11	The offender shall pay community plecement fees as determined by DOC:	
N 12	The residence location and living arrangements are subject to the prior approval of the department of con during the period of community placement.	rections
لأ⊫ ≓ 13	The offender shall submit to affirmative acts necessary to monitor compliance with court orders as requir DOC.	.eq pA
) 14 (j) 14	The Court may also order any of the following special conditions:	
4444 15 7777	X (I) The offender shall remain within, or outside of, a specified geographical boundary:	· ·····.
16	per DOC	
17	(II) The offender shall not have direct or indirect contact with the victim of the crime or a s class of individuals:	pecified
18	see \$43	
19	$X_{\rm (III)}$ The offender shall participate in crime-related treatment or counseling services;	
20	(IV) The offender shall not consume alcohol;	
они и 21 раса со	(V) The residence location and living arrangements of a sex offender shall be subject to the approval of the department of corrections; or	e pricr
22	\times (VI) The offender shall comply with any crime-related prohibitions.	
23		
24	Open i	
25 26	(VII) Other: IN ODERT ; SEP 1 2 2014 By COURT	
066027 0008	SEP 1 2 2014 Piorce County Clork DEPICE	
28	DEPUTY	
		Office of Prosecuting Attorney 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7400

Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 15, 2014 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9I3E2-A9D6AA0947E132BD Certified By: Kavin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington

State of Washington, County of Pierce ss: I, Kevin Stock, Clerk of the aforementioned court do hereby certify that this foregoing instrument is a true and correct copy of the original now on file in my office. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I herunto set my hand and the Seal of said Court this 15 day of September, 2014


ð Set. Kevin Stock, Pierce County Clerk

By <u>/S/Tyler Wherry</u>, Deputy. Dated: Sep 15, 2014 10:55 AM NUMBER SUPERIOR


Instructions to recipient: If you wish to verify the authenticity of the certified document that was transmitted by the Court, sign on to:

https://inxonline.co.plerce.wa.us/linxweb/Case/CaseFiling/certifiedDocumentView.cfm, enter SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD.

This document contains 14 pages plus this sheet, and is a true and correct copy of the original that is of record in the Pierce County Clerk's Office. The copy associated with this number will be displayed by the Court.



13-1-03133-9 1 đ [] (Out-of-Custody) Contact your CCO or other DOC representative to make an 2 001 appointment to submit a DNA sample. Your sample must be submitted within 60 days of today's date or the date you are released from jail, whichever comes later. 3 [X](In-Custody DOC) Submit to the biological sample draw by the Department of 4 Corrections. 5 [] (In-Custody PC Jail) Submit to biological sample draw by the Pierce County Jail. Sept. DONE IN OPEN COURT this 5th day of August, 2014. 6 ()į 7 Jener Co JUDG Ň $\langle 0 \rangle$ 8 (1)JERRY T. COSTELLO 9 Presented by: **** 10 **∖00**+ ~1 πi JESSÉ WILLIAMS -11 FILED 0 N Deputy Prosecuting Attorney DEPT IN OPEN COURT WSB# 35543 12 ٠, ۵J Approved as to form 13 ers Va SEP 1 2 2014 14 ф, MICHAEL MALTEY Pierce County Clerk Attorney for Defendant By сы*н -*г 15 WSB# 24754 r r r r DEPUTY 16 011 17 DARRELL PARNEL Defendant 18 19 20 4 . 1 . 21 - - - n 22 23 24 25 26 A -1 m A 28 ORDER FOR BIOLOGICAL SAMPLE DRAW Office of Prosecuting Attorney 930 Theoma Avenue S, Room 946 FOR DNA IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS -2 Tocoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7400



4444 13-1-03133-9 P = ++ m 1 0010 ACKNOWLEDGMENT 2 Regarding the foregoing advice of my "Right to Appeal": Э 4 1. I understand these rights; and 5 2 I waive formal reading of these rights, and 444 6 I acknowledge receipt of a true copy of these rights 3. ~ * * * * (17 9.5.14 BANJAN 的 DATE: DEFENDANT: ç 8 The, (i) DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY: 9 9.5.14 DATE: 1800 JUDGE: 10 ᆟ 2 ちくろうい JERRY T. COSTELLO 11 , LED - 12 DEPT 7 IN OPEN COURT 13 r-7 እ ም SEP 1 2 2014 14 Pierce County Clerk 15 By 0 DEPUTY 16 17 11 11 1 18 1.000 .19 20 21 22 23 # 5 5 F 24 nh rt y 25 26 27 28 Office of Proscenting Attorney 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946 Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (233) 798-7400 ADVICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL - 2 4666 11 m m m

	1 2 3 4 5 6	/	-03133-0 Date: September 14 2C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD Slock Pierce County Clerk, Washington IN OPEN COURT SEP 1 2 2014 Pierce County Clerk By DEPUTY
1	7	SUFERIOR COURT OF WASHI	NGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY
сн Ф	8	STATE OF WASHINGTON,	
(N) 	9		CAUSE NO: 13-1-03133-9 SEP 1 5 2014
л.,	10	DARRELL PARNEL BERRIAN,	WARRANT OF COMMITMENT
ហ៊ីរ	11		1) [] County Jail 2) 🐼 Dept. of Corrections
bu	12	Defendant.	3) [] Other Custody
FF	13		
	14		
	15		
	16	THE STATE OF WASHINGTON TO THE DIRECT	OR OF ADULT DETENTION OF PIERCE COUNTY:
	17 18 19	WHEREAS, Judgment has been pronounced against t Washington for the County of Pierce, that the defendant be Sentence/Order Modifying/Revoking Probation/Communi attached hereto.	e punished as specified in the Judgment and
	20 21	[] 1. YOU, THE DIRECTOR, ARE COMMANDED (classification, confinement and placement as order (Sentence of confinement in Pierce County Jail).	
	22 23	X 2. YOU, THE DIRECTOR, ARE COMMANDED the proper officers of the Department of Correcti	
44.43 40.44		YOU, THE PROPER OFFICERS OF THE DEP.	ARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
	25	ARE COMMANDED to receive the defendant for placement as ordered in the Judgment and Senter	or classification, confinement and
	26	Department of Corrections custody).	
	27		
	28		
5 c. h - 5 c. h -		WARRANT OF COMMITMENT -1	Office of Prosecuting Atlanney 930 Tacuma Avenue S. Ruom 946 Tacuma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7408

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Case Number: 13-1-03133-9 Date: September 13-14 SerialID: 7A742C29-110A-9BE2-A9D6AA0947E132BD 13-1-03133-9 Certified By: Kevin Stock Pierce County Clerk, Washington 1 YOU, THE DIRECTOR, ARE COMMANDED to receive the defendant for [] 3. 2 classification, confinement and placement as ordered in the Judgment and Sentence. (Sentence of confinement or placement not covered by Sections 1 and 2 above). 3 4 By direction of the Honorsble 9.5.14 5 Dated: ner KEVM STOEJERRY T. COSTELLO 6 ស្រុ 7 CLERK $|1\rangle$ (3)8 By: ()İ DEPUTY CLERK 9 4444 n n n n CERTIFIED COPY DELIVERED_TO SHERIFF 10 ·:† SEP 1 5 201 FILED еŚ 11 0 7 9 9 DEPT 7 IN OPEN COURT 12 STATE OF WASHINGTON SEP 1 2 2014 553 13 ڊ_م ريا County of Pierce Pierce County Clerk 14 ф, I, Kevin Stock, Clark of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that this foregoing By_ instrument is a true and currect copy of the w ~ 1. .. 15 DEPUTY rrr n original now on file in my office. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my 16 hand and the Seal of Said Court this day of 17 KEVIN STOCK, Clerk 18 Ey:_ Deputy 19 aim 20----21 r r r - -22 23 24 25 26 ~ ~ ~ ~ 27 28 Office of Prosecuting Attorney 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Room 946 WARRANT OF **COMMITMENT -2** Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 Telephone: (253) 798-7400